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* Although the term "developmentally disabled" may properly be used to refer to those
individuals who have cerebral palsy, epilepsy, or another neurological condition, the author
uses the term to refer to mentally retarded individuals exclusively. The American
Association of Mental Deficiency defines mental retardation as "significantly subaverage
general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with defects in adaptive behavior and
manifested during the developmental period." North Carolina Ass'n for Retarded Children
v. State, 420 F. Supp. 451, 453 (M.D.N.C. 1976) (footnote omitted).
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"[The Framers] conferred, as against the Government, the right
to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right
most valued by civilized men [and women]. '
I. INTRODUCTION
Although it is a canon of our collective moral and legal thought
that all human beings are created equal,' the developmentally dis-
abled have historically been deprived of that conceptual and prac-
tical equality. Indeed, developmentally disabled citizens have been
prevented from "fully participating in the human condition" s by
social obstacles as much as by their own disabilities. The develop-
mentally disabled have historically been perceived as sub-human,
lacking fundamental human needs such as those for love, intimacy,
and hope of achievement. 4 Developmentally disabled citizens have
also been widely viewed as other-human, as a mythical entity rep-
resented by a composite portrait exhibiting all the undesirable
qualities of the group as a whole.5
Within the past decade, we have witnessed the long-awaited
emergence of the developmentally disabled into the world of the
"truly human."' This emergence closely follows an increased recog-
nition of fundamental rights of the mentally handicapped, such as
the right to treatment,7 to care in the least restrictive setting,8 and
1. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
2. A negative eugenics program is implicitly based on the proposition that although
"[m]en might be born equal for some purposes . ..they are not born genetically equal."
Vukowich, The Dawning of the Brave New World-Legal, Ethical, and Social Issues of
Eugenics, 1971 U. ILL. L.F. 189, 208 (1971) (footnote omitted). See also K. Schwartz, Na-
ture's Corrective Principle in Social Evolution in 2 THE HISTORY OF MENTAL RETARDATION
149-50 (Rosen ed. 1976). For a discussion of eugenics in general see notes 12-15 and accom-
panying text.
3. Roos, Psychological Impact of Sterilization on the Individual, 1 LAW & PSYCH. REv.
45 (1975).
4. Id.
5. Bligh, Sterilization and Mental Retardation, 51 A.B.A.J. 1059, 1061 (1965) (quoting
FERNALD, THE BURDEN OF FEEBLE-MmIDEDNESS 23-24 (1912)). Throughout history, the men-
tally retarded citizen has been identified as: (1) a subhuman organism; (2) a menace; (3) an
unspeakable object of dread; (4) an object of pity; (5) a holy innocent; (6) a diseased organ-
ism; (7) an object of ridicule; and (8) an eternal child. LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA,
STERILIZATION 66-67 (1979).See generally, M. FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION (1973);
B. Blatt, Purgatory, in 2 THE HISTORY OF MENTAL RETARDATION 356-57 (Rosen, ed. 1976); P.
L. Howley, Attitudes of Parents, Career Personnel, and Volunteers Toward Sex Education
and Sex Participation for the Mentally Retarded 19-20 (June 1974) (unpublished thesis in
Florida State University Library).
6. Roos, supra note 3.
7. See, e.g., Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F.
Supp. 781, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971), 344 F. Supp. 373, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D.
Ala. 1972), aff'd in part, remanded in part, reserved in part sub. nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt,
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to liberty. The right to procreative freedom, however, is slow to
receive such recognition, for years of prejudice, mythology, and
false assumptions have prevented realization of procreation as a
'natural' right of the developmentally disabled citizen.
The purpose of this comment is to explore the "extent to which
myths, misunderstandings, and lack of knowledge within the gen-
eral community contribute to [the] 'civilized' oppression"10 of de-
velopmentally disabled persons. This comment shall first examine
the social climate in which the nonconsensual sterilization statutes
were enacted, then review the false assumptions upon which the
laws are based, emphasizing the relationship between those false
assumptions and the vulnerability of the statutes to constitutional
attack for denial of substantive due process to the developmentally
disabled citizen.
This comment will then discuss commonly accepted misunder-
standings concerning consensual sterilization which turn apparent
'consensual' sterilization into a potentially more dangerous form of
non-consensual sterilization. Lastly, the growing practice of court-
ordered sterilization in the absence of prior statutory authority will
be examined in light of its potential for breaking through old
myths and misconceptions, by forcing the deciding authority to
deal with the potential sterilization patient as an individual with
unique characteristics and concerns. In this context we shall look
at two cases, Wyatt v. Aderholt and In re Guardianship of Hayes,
503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). See generally Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46
A.B.A.J. 499 (1960).
In addition, the right to refuse treatment has increasingly become a recognized right of
the developmentally disabled. See generally Schwartz, In the Name of Treatment: Auton-
omy, Civil Commitment, and Right to Refuse Treatment, 50 NoTm DAME LAW. 808 (1975).
8. See, e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C.
Cir. 1966) cert. denied, 382 U.S. 863 (1965); Dixon v. Weinberger, 405 F. Supp. 974 (D.D.C.
1975); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972) vacated and remanded on
other grounds, 414 U.S. 413 (1974). But see Pennhurst State School and Hosp. v. Halder-
man, 101 S. Ct. 1531 (1981), holding that the bill of rights provision of the Developmentally
Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act does not create in favor of the developmentally
disabled individual any substantive rights to "appropriate treatment" in the "least restric-
tive" environment.
9. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975), condemning Florida's custodial
confinement of a non-dangerous mental patient.
For the pertinent provisions in Florida, see the Florida Mental Health Act, or the Baker
Act, FLA. STAT. §§ 394.451-.477 (1979 and Supp. 1980). For a general discussion of increas-
ingly recognized rights of the mentally disabled, see Steinbock, et al., Civil Rights of the
Mentally Retarded: An Overview. 1 LAW & PSYCH. Riy. 151 (1975).
10. Linn, Involuntary Sterilization-A Constitutional Awakening to Fundamental
Human Rights, 2 AMicus 34 (Feb. 1977).
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both which exemplify the discarding of stereotypic conceptualiza-
tion and pragmatic expediency in favor of concern for the
individual."
II. NON-CONSENSUAL STERILIZATION UNDER STATUTORY
AUTHORITY
A. Sociological, Legislative, and Judicial Background
"We bestow care upon the breeding of our chickens, horses and
cattle; is not the human being worthy of equal care?2 "
In 1883, Sir Francis Galton' s coined the term "eugenics" and de-
fined it as "[t]he study of agencies under social control which may
improve or impair the racial qualities of future generations either
physically or mentally.""' The eugenics movement, officially
11. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 368 F. Supp. 1383 (M.D. Ala. 1974). In re Guardianship of Hayes,
608 P.2d 635 (Wash. 1980). Even though Florida has never enacted a sterilization statute,
this emerging trend of court-ordered sterilization in the absence of statutory authority
makes the subject of sterilization a very relevant one for the state.
Compulsory sterilization has been supported by several Florida officials in the past. Two
successive superintendents of the Florida Farm Colony for Epileptic and Feeble-Minded
who served during the heyday of the eugenic movement, from 1919 to 1941, advocated the
enactment of a non-consensual sterilization statute:
When we witness the ever increasing procession of the criminal, the defective, the
handicapped and unfit into our jails, mental hospitals and reformatories, and con-
sider the staggering cost of this never ending horde we stand amazed that civiliza-
tion is doing so little in the way of prevention .... No wholesale remedy appears
available, but a step towards checking this on-rushing horde now devouring civili-
zation would be the surgical sterilization of every feebleminded person coming
within the purview of the law, thus precluding them from reproducing their
kind.. . . And, at first would only reach comparatively few, but as the years go on
thousands and hundreds of thousands would be denied the power of spreading
throughout the land his or her defective progeny. Can civilization stand the strain
if nothing is done to lessen or stop it?
EIGHTH BIENNIAL REPORT OF THE SUPERINTENDENT OF THE FLORIDA FARM COLONY FOR EPILEP-
Tic AN -FIEBLE-MINDED 7 (1935).
12. Kenyon, Sterilization of the Unfit, 1 VA. L. REv. 458, 466 (1914).
13. John Humphrey Noyes, a Perfectionist Minister, is credited with being the first
American to formally advocate human betterment programs in 1848. Bender, A Geneticist's
Viewpoint Toward Sterilization, 2 Amicus 45 (Feb. 1977). But the ideas are far from new.
Plato wrote:
The principle has been already laid down that the best of either sex should be
united with the best as often, and the inferior with the inferior, as seldom as pos-
sible; and that they should rear the offspring of the one sort of union, but not of
the other, if the flock is to be maintained in first-rate condition.
PLATO, REPUBLIC, CH. V, 459 (Jowett Translation).
14. The word eugenics is derived from a Greek word meaning well-born. LAw REFORM
COMMISSION OF CANADA, supra note 5, at 25.
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launched by 1904, was based on the assumption that certain types
of individuals were more socially desirable than others. Persons
possessing more desirable traits should be encouraged to propagate
so as to protect or improve the gene pool (positive eugenics), while
other less desirable persons should be prohibited from increasing
their kind (negative eugenics).
The eugenics movement thrived in response to events occurring
at the end of the nineteenth century. The rediscovery of Mendel's
laws of heredity and the development of a relatively safe and sim-
ple surgical technique for the prevention of procreation provided
both theory and technique to the Galtonian ideology. Although
Mendel's work had been limited to the transmission of simple
traits in plants, eugenicists asserted that Mendel's findings con-
cerning heredity were equally applicable to complex traits in
human beings. Eugenicists argued that mental illness, retardation,
epilepsy, criminality, and various other social defects were heredi-
tary, and therefore, could be eliminated from the gene pool
through proper measures such as sexual sterilization of the
"dunfit."115
A few years prior to the rediscovery of Mendel's laws, Dr. Harry
C. Sharp of the Indiana State Reformatory developed a technique
for sterilizing males (vasectomy), while at the same time in France,
a method for sterilizing females (salpingectomy) was being per-
fected. Sharp reportedly sterilized approximately 700 boys at the
Indiana Reformatory well before the Indiana sterilization statute
was passed."
The legislative history of eugenic sterilization began in 1897 in
Michigan with the introduction and subsequent defeat of a bill au-
thorizing involuntary sterilization. Eight years later, Pennsylvania
passed a sterilization bill entitled "An Act for the Prevention of
Idiocy," but Pennsylvania Governor Pennypacker vetoed the bill
and returned it to the legislature with this message:
15. In May 1911, the Research Committee of the Eugenics Section of the American
Breeders Association postulated ten remedies "for purging from the blood of the [human]
race the innately defective strains:" (1) life segregation; (2) sterilization; (3) restrictive mar-
riage laws and customs; (4) eugenic education of the public and prospective mates; (5) sys-
tems of mating purporting to remove defective traits; (6) environmental betterment; (7) po-
lygamy; (8) euthanasia; (9) Neo-Malthusianism; (10) laissez-faire. The Committee advocated
the first two remedies as possessing the greatest potential. Id.
16. Other zealous eugenicists included F. Hoyt Pilcher, Superintendent of the Winfield
Kansas State Home for the Feeble-Minded, who castrated forty-four boys and fourteen girls
in the mid-1890's. Ferster, Eliminating the Unfit-Is Sterilization the Answer? 27 OHIO ST.
L.J. 591, 592 (1966).
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This bill has what may be called with propriety an attractive title.
If idiocy could be prevented by an Act of Assembly, we may be
quite sure an act would have long been passed and approved in
this State .... It is plain that the safest and most effective
method of preventing procreation would be to cut the heads off
the inmates, and such authority is given by the Bill to this staff of
scientific experts .... A great objection is that the bill ...
would be the beginning of experimentation upon living human
beings, leading logically to results which can readily be
forecasted.17
Two years later, in 1907, Indiana enacted the first compulsory ster-
ilization law. The statute, however, was declared unconstitutional
in 1921, as were other similar statutes in Michigan, New Jersey,
and New York, prior to 1925.18
It was in 1927 that advocates of eugenic sterilization won their
most important victory, a victory which has fueled the eugenic
movement to this day. The United States Supreme Court upheld
the validity of a Virginia sterilization statute against several cogent
constitutional attacks in the case of Buck v. Bell.1" Mr. Justice
Holmes, speaking for the Court, held that the Virginia law was a
reasonable regulation under the state's police power and was not a
violation of either the due process or equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment.
The plaintiff, Carrie Buck, was an eighteen-year-old woman
committed to the Virginia State Colony for Epileptics and Feeble-
Minded. Carrie was the daughter of a feeble-minded woman and
the mother of an allegedly20 feeble-minded child. The Virginia
statute under which officials sought to have Carrie sterilized was
premised on the assumption that the state supported in institu-
tions "many defective persons who if now discharged would be-
17. S. BRAKEL AND R. ROCK, THE MENTALLY DiSABLED AND THE LAW 208 (1971) (citing
Vetoes by the Governor of Bills Passed by the Legislature, Session of 1905, p. 26).
18. Williams v. Smith, 131 N.E. 2 (Ind. 1921); Smith v. Board of Examiners of Feeble-
minded, 88 A. 963 (N.J. 1913); Haynes v. Lapeer Circuit Judge, 166 N.W. 938 (Mich. 1918);
In re Thompson, 103 Misc. 23, 169 N.Y.S. 638 (Sup. Ct. 1918), aff'd mem. sub nom. Osborn
v. Thompson, 185 App. Div. 902, 171 N.Y.S. 1094 (3d Dep't 1918).
19. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
20. Evidence reveals that Carrie's daughter was not mentally retarded at all, but was
labeled defective at the age of one month by a Red Cross nurse. By the time the child had
finished second grade, she was reportedly very bright. In addition, Carrie's mother was only
mildly retarded which, in the terminology of the day meant that she was a moron, not an
imbecile. Burgdorf, The Wicked Witch is Almost Dead: Buck v. Bell and the Sterilization
of Handicapped Persons, 50 TEMPLE L.Q. 995, 1006-7 (1977).
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come a menace but if incapable of procreating might be discharged
with safety and become self-supporting with benefit to themselves
and to society." ' Responding to the substantive due process argu-
ments raised by plaintiff's counsel, Justice Holmes wrote:
We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call
upon the best citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it
could not call upon those who already sap the strength of the
state for these lesser sacrifices, often not felt to be such by those
concerned, in order to prevent our being swamped with incompe-
tence. It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute
degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their im-
becility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from
continuing their kind. The principle that sustains compulsory
vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes.
Three generations of imbeciles are enough.22
21. 274 U.S. at 205-06.
22. Id. at 207 (citations omitted). It is interesting to note that the nonconsensual eugenic
sterilization statute at issue in Buck was repealed by the Virginia legislature years later and
that a consensual sterilization procedure was enacted in its stead. The contrast between the
two statutes is striking; the difference between the stated purposes reflects the shedding of
some misconceptions, and the more elaborate standards exhibited by the present Virginia
statute reflect an increased concern for the developmentally disabled individual.
The Virginia nonconsensual sterilization act (Acts 1924, Ch. 394, p. 569) read in part as
follows:
Whereas, both the health of the individual patient and the welfare of society
may be promoted in certain cases by the sterilization of mental defectives under
careful safeguard and by competent and conscientious authority; and
Whereas, the Commonwealth has in custodial care and is supporting in various
State institutions many defective persons who if now discharged or paroled would
likely become by the propagation of their kind a menace to society but who if
incapable of procreating might properly and safely be discharged or paroled and
become self-supporting with benefit both to themselves and to society; and
Whereas, human experience has demonstrated that heredity plays an important
part in the transmission of insanity, idiocy, imbecility, epilepsy and crime; now,
therefore,
1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of Virginia, that whenever the Su-
perintendent. . . shall be of opinion that it is for the best interests of the patients
and of society that any inmate of the institution under his care should be sexually
sterilized, such superintendent is hereby authorized to perform ... the operation
of sterilization on any such patient confined in such institution afflicted with he-
reditary forms of insanity that are recurrent, idiocy, imbecility, feeble-mindedness
or epilipsy.. ..
Buck v. Bell, 130 S.E. 516, 517 n.1 (Va. 1925).
The Virginia consensual sterilization statute presently in effect reads in part as follows:
§ 54-325.11. Sterilization operations for certain adults incapable of informed
consent.-It shall be lawful . . . to perform a . . . sexual sterilization procedure
on a person eighteen years of age or older, who does not have the capacity to give
informed consent to such an operation, when:
19811
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Buck v. Bell sparked the introduction of numerous eugenic sterili-
zation bills; twenty statutes were passed in the ten years following
the Supreme Court decision.
B. Analysis of Present Statutes
At present, nine states have nonconsensual sterilization stat-
utes." Since 1970, nine state legislatures have repealed their steril-
ization statutes,2" while one statute has become inoperative by
3. The court has determined that a full, reasonable, and comprehensible medi-
cal explanation as to the meaning, consequences, and risks of the sterilization op-
eration to be performed and as to alternative methods of contraception has been
given by the physician to the person upon whom the operation is to be performed,
to the person's guardian, if any, to the person's spouse, if any, and, if there is no
spouse, to the parent;
4. The court has determined (i) that the person has been adjudicated incompe-
tent . . . and (ii) that the person is unlikely to develop mentally to a sufficient
degree to make an informed judgment about sterilization in the foreseeable future;
5. The court, to the greatest extent possible, has elicited and taken into ac-
count the views of the person concerning the sterilization, giving the views of the
person such weight in its decision as the court deems appropriate;
6. The court has complied with the requirements of § 54-325.12;
§ 54-325.12. Standards for court-authorized sterilization of certain persons.-A.
In order for the circuit court to authorize the sterilization of a person.., it must
be proven by clear and convincing evidence that:
1. There is a need for contraception. The court shall find that the person is
engaging in sexual activity at the present time or is likely to engage in sexual
activity in the near future and that pregnancy would not usually be intended by
such person if such person were competent and engaging in sexual activity under
similar circumstances;
2. There is no reasonable alternative method of contraception;
3. The proposed method of sterilization conforms with standard medical prac-
tice, and the treatment can be carried out without unreasonable risk to the life
and health of the person; and
4. The nature and extent of the person's mental disability renders the person
permanently incapable of caring for and raising a child. The court shall base this
finding on empirical evidence and not solely on standardized tests.
B. The criteria set out in subsection A of this section shall be established for
the court by independent evidence based on a medical, social, and psychological
evaluation of the person upon whom the sterilization operation is to be performed.
23. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-501-502 (1971); DzL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 5701-5705 (1974);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34, §§ 2461-2468 (1964); Miss. CODE ANN., § 41-45-1-19 (1972);
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 35-36-50 (1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, §§ 341-346 (1979); S.C.
CODE §§ 44-47-10-100 (1976); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 64-10-1-13 (1953); W. VA. CODE §§ 27-
16-1-5 (1980). Maine has both a non-consensual and consensual portion of its statute. Al-
though North Carolina requires the consent or objection of the patient and kin to be re-
corded, neither is controlling. For this reason, the author treats the North Carolina statute
as non-consensual.
24. 1974 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 185 § 1 repealing ARiz. REy. STAT. ANN § 36-531--540
(1956). 1979 Cal. Stats. c. 552 § 1, c. 730 § 156.5 repealing CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 7254
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court decision. While the total number of sterilizations performed
each year pursuant to these statutes has dropped significantly
since 1950,16 the unchallenged statutes leave open the potential for
an increase in the exercise of the power to sterilize. This is a cause
for concern to those who find the empirical basis for any genetic
rationale unpersuasive, as well as to those who are committed to a
"natural" right theory of procreative freedom.
1. To Whom Applied
Seven of the nine nonconsensual sterilization statutes explicitly
apply to individuals who are mentally ill and to those who are
mentally retarded; Utah's statute applies only to residents of a
mental retardation facility, while West Virginia's statute seemingly
applies to any individual who has been declared mentally incompe-
tent. In addition, four states (Delaware, Mississippi, Oklahoma,
and South Carolina) extend the application of their statutes to
epileptics.
2. Procedure
Although the United States Supreme Court has not had occasion
to determine the minimum standards for procedural due process
applicable in the context of sterilization, legal authority suggests
that non-consensual sterilization statutes should provide at a
minimum:
1. Personal notice to the person subject to sterilization, and if
that person is unable to comprehend what is involved or is a mi-
nor, notice to the individual's legal representative, guardian, or
nearest relative;
2. A hearing by the board or court designated in the statute to
determine the propriety of the prospective sterilization. At such
hearing, evidence may be presented, and the patient must be pre-
sent and/or represented by counsel, guardian, or relative;
effective Jan. 1, 1980. 1972 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 21 § 1 repealing IDAHO CODE § 66-801---812
(1947). 1974 Ind. Acts, P.L. 60 § 1 repealing IND. CODE ANN. § 16-13-13-1-16-13-16-1
(1973). 1977 Iowa Acts ch. 77 § 1 repealing IowA CODE ANN. § 145.1-.22 (1972). 1974 Mich.
Pub. Acts No. 258 § 1106 repealing MICH. Cow. LAWS § 720.301-.310 (1968). 1975 N. H.
Laws 43:1 repealing N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 174:1-:14 (1964) 1979 N.D. Seass. Laws ch. 93, §
I repealing N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-04.1-02-08 (1967). 1974 S.D. Sess. Laws ch. 187 repealing
S.D. CODIFIED LAWs ANN. § 27-11-1--6.
25. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama ruled the Ala-
bama statute unconstitutional in Wyatt v. Aderholt, 368 F. Supp. 1382 (1974).
26. Ferster, supra note 16, at 614.
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3. An opportunity to appeal the board's ruling to a court of
competent jurisdiction.2 7
An examination of the nine state statutes currently in effect
reveals that not all of these procedural requirements are being met.
Six of the statutes are applicable only to institutionalized persons
(Delaware, Minnesota, Mississippi, Oklahoma, South Carolina,
Utah); in all of these, the superintendent or director of the institu-
tion initiates the procedure by petitioning a board or court for
sterilization. In the three states whose statutes are applicable to
both institutionalized and non-institutionalized individuals, the
county director of social services (North Carolina), guardian, par-
ent (Georgia), or the committee or authority responsible for such
individuals (West Virginia) may petition for sterilization. All stat-
utes except Delaware's require notice to be served upon the indi-
vidual, and all require notice to be given to a guardian or relative
when the patient is incompetent or a minor.
Only seven of the statutes provide for a hearing to determine the
appropriateness of the sterilization request (Arkansas, Mississippi,
North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Utah, West Virginia).
The hearing may be before the board of trustees of the mental in-
stitution (Mississippi), a State Board of Affairs (Oklahoma), a De-
partment of Health and Environmental Control (South Carolina),
or the district court (Arkansas, North Carolina, Utah, West Vir-
ginia). Five of the seven statutes requiring a hearing also provide
that the patient should appear at the hearing (Arkansas, Missis-
sippi, Oklahoma, South Carolina, West Virginia). All of the seven
statutes provide for the appointment of a guardian ad litem to de-
fend the rights and interests of the patient, but only three of the
statutes expressly indicate that the patient is entitled to present
and cross-examine witnesses on his/her own behalf (Arkansas,
North Carolina, West Virginia). All of the seven statutes allow for
an appeal to be taken from the order entered after the hearing to
the appropriate tribunal.
3. Justification for Sterilization
Six of the nine non-consensual sterilization statutes expressly
27. In Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207, the Court simply stated that the patient "has had
due process of law." POZGAR, LEGAL AsPEcTs OF HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION 142 (1979).
See also Krrram, THE RIGHT To BE DrIFERENT 322 (1971); BRAKEL A RoCK, supra note
17, at 214-216 (1971).
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state the premise upon which sterilization is based. All of the six
are based on eugenic premises (Minnesota, Mississippi, North Car-
olina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, West Virginia); two of those six
also express an environmental premise2 8 (North Carolina, West
Virginia), and one, fiscal concerns (Oklahoma)2 9
4. Standards
The standards for obtaining a sterilization order vary widely
among the states. The Delaware statute requires merely a finding
that "procreation is inadvisable;"30 Utah specifies only that the
"interests of institutionalized residents or of society" and a com-
pelling state interest be found to require such sterilization.3 1 Other
statutes explicate more elaborate standards, such as the Oklahoma
statute, which specifies that the petitioner prove:
1. patient is the potential parent of "socially inadequate off-
spring likewise afflicted,"
2. patient may be sterilized without detriment to his/her
health,
3. welfare of society and patient will be promoted, or,
4. patient will continue to be a public or partial charge or sup-
ported in any manner or form by charity.32
C. Substantive Due Process
Statutes authorizing the non-consensual sterilization of develop-
mentally disabled persons have traditionally been challenged on
the grounds that they: (1) impose cruel and unusual punishment;"8
(2) classify and treat persons in violation of equal protection of the
laws;" (3) authorize a "taking" in the absence of procedural due
28. See text accompanying footnotes 86-93.
29. See text accompanying footnotes 110-117.
30. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5701 (1974).
31. UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-10-1, 4 (1976).
32. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 342 (1979).
33. See, e.g., State v. Feilen, 126 P. 75 (Wash. 1912), the first case in which the inherent
cruelty of sterilizing a convicted felon was examined. See generally Kindregan, Sixty Years
of Compulsory Eugenic Sterilization: "Three Generations of Imbeciles" and the Constitu-
tion of the United States, 43 CHI.-KErr L. Rzv. 125-30 (1966).
34. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), holding unconstitutional an
Oklahoma statute which excepted from its operation persons convicted of embezzlement,
but not those convicted of larceny; Smith v. Board of Examiners of Feeble-minded, 88 A.
963 (N.J. 1913). See also Ruby v. Massey, 452 F. Supp. 361 (D. Conn. 1978), holding state
action of making sterilization available only to institutionalized patients to be violative of
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process;3 5 and (4) infringe upon fundamental rights beyond the
reasonable exercise of the state's police power." Although the
courts generally have been unresponsive to substantive due process
claims, this last constitutional guarantee will be given more serious
and renewed attention as the rights of the developmentally dis-
abled citizen are reviewed in light of modern knowledge of genetics
and child-development.
Two legal theories have been advanced attacking the constitu-
tional validity of non-consensual sterilization statutes. The first
theory centers around the due process requirement that non-con-
sensual sterilization must be "necessary" in order to achieve a
compelling state interest. Demonstration of a compelling state in-
terest depends upon the scientific validity of the premises upon
which the statutes are based. The proponents of invalidation of
sterilization statutes on constitutional grounds believe that the
original premises are erroneous. They conclude, therefore, that
non-consensual sterilization deprives the developmentally disabled
patient of his/her liberty without due process of law.
The second theory regards procreation as a fundamental or 'nat-
ural' liberty which cannot be interfered with by any governmental
order, regardless of the scientific or empirical validity of that or-
der. Under a compelling state interest paradigm, proponents of
this view suggest that the right of procreation far outweighs any
contribution to the public welfare made by involuntary steriliza-
tion so that the level of a compelling state interest is never
achieved. Under a more normative approach, adherents to the view
argue that government should have no voice in or control over the
procreative decision.
There are . . . certain principles of right and justice which are
entitled to prevail of their own intrinsic excellence, altogether re-
gardless of the attitude of those who wield the physical resources
of the community. Such principles were made by no human
hands; indeed, if they did not antedate deity itself, they still so
express its nature as to bind and control it. They are eternal to all
Will as such and interpenetrate all Reason as such. They are eter-
nal and immutable. In relation to such principles, human laws
equal protection. See generally Kindregan, supra note 1, at 130-32; Note, Legislative Na-
ivete in Involuntary Sterilization Laws, 1976 WAKE FoREST L. Rzv. 1064, 1079-80 (1976).
35. Fr a discussion of minimum procedural due process rights, see text accompanying
notes 175-202 infra. See also Comment, Sterilization, Retardation, and Parental Authority,
1978 B.Y.U.L. REV. 380, 407 (1978).
36. Smith v. Board of Examiners of Feeble-minded, 88 A. 963 (N.J. 1913).
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are, when entitled to obedience save as to matters indifferent,
merely a record or transcript, and their enactment an act not of
will or power but one of discovery and declaration."
1. No Compelling State Interest
In determining whether an exercise of the state's police power
affecting individual rights comports with the substantive due pro-
cess guarantee of the Constitution, the courts traditionally have
balanced the interest which the state seeks to promote or protect
against the nature of the asserted right." The court "consider[s]
private deprivation, societal benefits, and possibilities of the state
realizing those benefits at a lower cost."39 When deprivation of a
fundamental right is not at stake, a statute must bear a rational
relation to a permissible state interest or concern .4  In this in-
stance the court entertains a presumption of rational correctness in
favor of the judgment of the legislature as the body of the people's
elected representatives.4 1 When fundamental rights or personal lib-
erties are involved, however, constitutional standards require a
more rigorous test and process of review. The state may prevail
only by showing an overriding, compelling state interest to be
achieved by the legislation.42 Under a compelling state interest
analysis, the court must strictly scrutinize the legislation to find an
interest for which the legislation is both a necessary' and, in
method or implementation, least intrusive measure conducive to
the legislative purpose.
The United States Supreme Court has firmly established one's
37. Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law, 42 HAHv.
L. REv. 149, 152 (1928). See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 511 n.4 (Black, J., dis-
senting), for a collection of the "catchword" sources of the natural justice philosophy.
38. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
39. Cavitt v. Cavitt, 157 N.W.2d 171, 180 (Neb. 1968).
40. North Carolina Ass'n for Retarded Children v. State, 420 F. Supp. 451, 458
(M.D.N.C. 1976).
41. Lindsley v. National Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911); In re Sterilization of
Moore, 221 S.E.2d 307, 314 (N.C. 1976).
42. See Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684 (1977); Bates v. Little Rock,
361 U.S. 516 (1960). But see Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976), sug-
gesting that a less rigorous test of "any significant state interest" be used when a minor is
involved.
43. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964). The court will not assume any fac-
tual situation in order to validate the statute. Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395
U.S. 621, 627 (1969).
44. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
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personal control over procreative decisions as a fundamental con-
stitutional right encompassed by a recognized zone of privacy pro-
tected by the fourteenth amendment." In Skinner v. Oklahoma,
the Court outlined the fundamental nature of the interest in-
volved: "We are dealing here with legislation which involves one of
the basic civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation are funda-
mental to the very existence and survival of the race."" More re-
cently, in Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Court, in striking down a stat-
ute proscribing the use of contraceptives, reiterated: "If the right
of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, mar-
ried or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion
into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child."' 7
It is clear, then, that in order for non-consensual sterilization to
withstand constitutional scrutiny, it must be a necessary and least
possible intrusive means of fulfilling a compelling state interest.
Part (a) of this comment addresses the necessity requirement by
discussing the misconceptions underlying compulsory pterilization
legislation; part (b) addresses the second requirement by looking at
other less intrusive alternatives to sterilization.
a. Justifications and False Assumptions
Eugenic-The eugenic movement of the early twentieth century
was based on at least three premises: (1) certain types of social
deficiencies are hereditary; (2) a fast-paced biological deterioration
of the gene pool and, therefore, of the human race is occurring; (3)
certain types of socially unfit persons are contributing relatively
more to that deterioration by their lack of sexual self-control and
consequent high level of fecundity. All of these premises were ex-
plicitly or implicitly accepted, and thereby strengthened, by the
United States Supreme Court in Buck v. Bell.' 8 Although these
premises may underlie arguments in favor of non-consensual steril-
ization today, in large measure they have been refuted by advances
in genetic research and related scientific study.
45. The right to privacy encompasses matters such as abortion, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973); contraception, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); and marriage, Lov-
ing v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). For cases extending protection to minors, see Carey v.
Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52
(1976).
46. 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
47. 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (emphasis in original).
48. 274 U.S. 200.
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The notion that mental deficiency and other socially undesirable
characteristics are hereditary has been prevalent throughout his-
tory. Samual G. Howe reported to the Senate of the Common-
wealth of Massachusetts in 1848 that mental deficiency was a he-
reditary taint inflicted upon those parents who violate certain
"natural laws":
The moral to be drawn from the existence of the individual id-
iot is this,-he, or his parents, have so far violated the natural
laws, so far marred the beautiful organism of the body, that it is
an unfit instrument for the manifestation of the powers of the
soul .... [A] very large class of persons ignore the conditions
upon which alone health and reason are given to men, and conse-
quently they sin in various ways ... and thus bring down the
awful consequences of their own ignorance and sin upon the
heads of their unoffending children."9
Howe cited intemperance, masturbation, intermarriage of relatives,
and attempted procurement of abortion as the sins of the parents
which resulted in the mental retardation of their children.'0
The notion that mental deficiency is hereditary was fueled in
large part by the results of geneological studies of certain 'royal
families' of the feeble-minded.' ' 1 The Jukes family, allegedly con-
taining over 1200 mentally defective members," was compared to
the descendants of Jonathan Edwards, whose impressive statistics
appeared in a medical journal of the day.'8 Referring to the Jukes
study and other study results, one doctor asked, "Which is to be
considered, the individual of this stamp or the public?""
The validity of these familiar studies has been thrown into
doubt. Dr. Abraham Myerson writes:
Without in the least denying the important role of heredity, it
can only be stated that low cultural level, especially occurring in
49. S. G. Howe, On the Causes of Idiocy, in ROSEN, ET AL., 1 THE HISTORY OF MENAL
RETARDATION 31, 34 (1976).
50. Id.
51. Myerson, Certain Medical and Legal Phases of Eugenic Sterilization, 52 YALE L.J.
618, 622 (1943).
52. Kenyon, supra note 12, at 467.
53. Id. at 469. Those statistics included: 395 college graduates, 65 college professors, 13
college presidents, 60 physicians, 100 clergymen and missionaries, 75 military officers, 60
prominent authors, 100 lawyers, 30 judges, and 80 public officials, including a vice-president
of the United States and three United States senators.
54. Id. at 467-68 (quoting Dr. N. W. Barr).
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sequestered groups, has been called feeble-mindedness on very
scanty and insufficient evidence-evidence which any court of law
would throw out as the worst sort of irrelevance and which sci-
ence should not even consider.55
Beginning in the early 1930's, biologists and researchers began to
retreat from the view that all forms of mental deficiency are hered-
itary. The American Neurological Association in 1936 publicly ex-
pressed concern that eugenic sterilization statutes were based on a
presumption of heredity which was far from certain.5 6 One year
later, the American Medical Association reiterated that sentiment
when it reported:
Our present knowledge regarding human heredity is so limited
that there appears to be very little scientific basis to justify limi-
tation of conception for eugenic reasons .... There is conflicting
evidence regarding the transmissibility of epilepsy and mental
disorders.57
Today there are over 200 known causes of mental retardation."
Most all of the known and unknown causes could be subsumed
under the following three classifications: (1) mental retardation ge-
netically transmitted; (2) mental retardation resulting from physi-
cal damage to or maldevelopment of the brain; and (3) mental re-
tardation due to environmental deprivation.5" Even for mental
retardation which is based solely on genetic factors, sterilization
would not significantly reduce the incidence of retardation, for
many genetic causes of retardation are transmitted by phenotypi-
cally-normal parents.10 When account is also taken of mental retar-
dation which is not based solely on genetic factors, it becomes evi-
dent that the protection of substantive due process is lacking, for
non-consensual sterilization statutes cannot possibly accomplish or
55. Myerson, supra note 51, at 622.
56. Ferster, supra note 16, at 603 (quoting COMMITTEE OF THE AmERiCA NEUROLOGICAL
ASSOCIATION, EUGENICAL STERILIZATION 178 (1936)).
57. Id. (quoting AMERICAN MEDIcAL ASSOCIATION, PROCEEDINGS 54 (May 1937)).
58. CONLEY, THE ECONOMICS OF MENTAL RETARDATION 11 (1973). For a general discussion
of the causes of retardation, see LAw REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA, supra note 5, at 12-
13. Recent authority suggests that over forty percent of recognized mental defects are still
attributed to "unknown causes." Bender, A Geneticist Viewpoint Towards Sterilization, 2
AMICUS 45, 47 (Feb. 1977).
59. Conley, supra note 56, at 11.
60. KrrrRm, supra note 27, at 374. Even if all known defectives could be sterilized, there
would only be an eleven percent reduction of mental deficiency in the next generation. Id.
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even advance their stated eugenic goal.
Downs Syndrome provides an example of retardation resulting
solely from inheritance of a defective gene, which in this case is
most often a mutation of the mother's gene associated with ad-
vancing age. 1 The mutation does not cause retardation in the
mother. An effective eugenic program, however, would necessitate
the sterilization of phenotypically-normal persons, like the mother,
who carry a defective gene and who would not or could not refrain
from reproduction through normal contraceptive measures. The
practical problems, such as identification of carriers,62 as well as
the ethical problems of compulsory control through sterilization,
are obvious, especially when one remembers that phenotypically-
normal carriers are up to thirty times more numerous than persons
exhibiting the defective traits.
Because statutes which impact upon fundamental rights must be
effective, as well as narrowly and exactly drawn to fulfill the under-
lying compelling state interest," current statutes authorizing the
sterilization only of the retarded may be constitutionally infirm as
under-inclusive on this basis. 5
In some cases, the genetic defect does not determine retardation,
but must combine with environmental factors for the defect to be
exhibited. For example, phenylketonuria (PKU) is a genetically
transmitted disease associated with retarded intellectual growth
caused by the failure of a liver enzyme to metabolize the amino
acid phenylalanine. 6 Children who test positively for PKU are
placed on a special diet consisting wholly of a formula which is low
61. Murdock, Sterilization of the Retarded: A Problem or a Solution? 62 CAL. L. REv.
917, 924-25 (1974).
62. Id. at 924.
63. Bligh, supra note 5, at 1062.
64. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973). NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963).
65. Murdock, supra note 61, at 927. In addition, statutes may be over-inclusive as being
applicable to classes of persons without regard to the dominant or recessive nature of the
inheritable gene. Id. For instance, Tay-Sachs, a disease associated with mental retardation,
is transmitted by a recessive gene, thereby causing retardation only in those persons who are
homozygous, that is, only when both genes governing the trait are defective. Thus, if one
parent is homozygous-recessive (therefore retarded) while the other parent is heterozygous,
a fifty percent chance exists that the offspring will be retarded. Where both parents are
heterozygous (phenotypically-normal but Tay-Sachs gene carriers), the level drops to a
twenty-five percent chance of conceiving an affected offspring. Only in cases where both
parents are homozygous recessive is there virtual certainty of inherited retardation. By con-
trast, in cases such as those involving Downs Syndrome, where retardation is transmitted by
a dominant gene, retardation will appear statistically in fifty percent of the offspring. Id. at
926. See also LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA, supra note 5, at 39-41.
66. MNOOKIN, CHILD, FAMILY AND STATE 410 (1978).
1981]
616 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:599
in phenylalanine, for it is believed that dietary control can arrest
mental retardation in the PKU-positive child. 7 The example is il-
lustrative of the fact that with retardation caused by the interplay
of genetic and environmental factors, identifying and controlling
the relevant environmental factors may be all that is necessary to
avoid the expression and transmission of retardation.
A second known cause of mental retardation is physical damage
to or maldevelopment of the brain resulting from infections in the
mother during pregnancy or in the infant after birth, ingestion of
toxic substances by the mother during pregnancy or by the infant
after birth, injuries occurring at birth, or accidents occurring
among children. 8 As with retardation caused by the influence of
environmental factors upon genetic defects, sterilization is inap-
propriate in these circumstances.
Finally, retardation may result from an impoverished intellec-
tual and emotional environment which deprives young children of
necessary mental and developmental stimulation.69 The state may
rationalize sterilization in this context only if it assumes all chil-
dren are predestined to be culturally deprived.7 0 An examination of
other less drastic alternatives to sterilization reveals that the state
must undertake affirmative steps to alleviate the cultural depriva-
tion before it may restrict the right of procreation.
Another misconception which fueled the passage of eugenic ster-
ilization statutes in the early part of the century was the belief
"[t]hat the degeneracy of the race [is] growing far beyond the nor-
mal increase of the population."' 1 The sterilization statutes were
"expressive of a state policy apparently based on the growing belief
that, due to the alarming increase in the number of degenerates,
criminals, feeble-minded, and insane, our race is facing the greatest
peril of all time. '72 Sterilization advocates asked, "How are we...
to overcome the evil and stem the flow of this rising tide? ' 73 and
answered, "There is but one remedy, and that is sterilization.7 4
The American Neurological Association in 1936 was among the
first to question this eugenic assumption. The Association con-
67. Id., at 411-13.
68. Conley, supra note 58, at 11.
69. Murdock, supra note 61, at 927.
70. Conley, supra note 58, at 11.
71. Kenyon, supra note 12, at 465 (quoting Dr. Henri Bogart's statement in the Texas
Medical Journal for February, 1911).
72. Shartel, Sterilization of Mental Defectives, 24 MicH. L. REv. 1, 18 (1925).
73. Kenyon, supra note 12, at 464.
74. Id. (emphasis in original).
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cluded that "[tihere is nothing to indicate that mental disease and
mental defect are increasing, and from this standpoint there is no
evidence of a biological deterioration of the race. '7 5 In addition, in
1943, Dr. Abraham Myerson discounted the threat of increasing bi-
ological deterioration. He wrote:
Certain myths must be dispelled in order to view the problem
realistically. One argument made for widespread sterilization is
that the number of insane is increasing by leaps and bounds and,
therefore, the race is threatened in a serious way by the propaga-
tion of the unfit. It is true that the admission rate to hospitals for
mental disease has gone up enormously within the past few gener-
ations. But a growing public consciousness that mental disease is
treatable has been almost solely responsible for this increase.7 6
Myerson cited as countervailing forces to increases in mental dis-
ease a lower marriage rate, higher divorce rate, greater death rate,
and lower birth rate among mentally handicapped persons. 7 Myer-
son also cited the simple fact that society has become more con-
scious of mental condition: "A feeble-minded shepherd would not
be particularly noticed. But a moron trying to operate machinery
would show his defectiveness very quickly. '78
A peculiar myth concerning the sexuality of the developmentally
disabled person contributed to the fear which fueled the eugenic
movement. As a 1914 article concluded, "It is a well-known fact
that exaggerated sexuality is a marked characteristic of the imbe-
cile, '79 and "wheresoever they come in contact with those of the
opposite sex they have no power of controlling the sexual im-
pulse."80 A report to the governor of Kansas in 1919 perpetuated
the myth: "All the feeble-minded lack self-control. . . .Their im-
moral tendencies and lack of self-control make the birth rate
75. Ferster, supra note 167, at 602 (quoting COMMITTEE OF AMERICAN NEUROLOGICAL As-
SOCIATION, EUGENICAL STERILIZATION 56 (1936)).
76. Myerson, supra note 51, at 626. The superintendent of the Florida Farm Colony for
Epileptic and Feeble-Minded expressed concern in 1922 that while the increase of the gen-
eral population from 1880 was 110%, the increase of patients with mental disease during the
same period was allegedly 468%. SECOND BIENNIAL REPORT OF THE SUPERINTENDENT OF THE
FLORIDA FARM COLONY FOR EPILEPTIC AND FEEBLE-MINDED 16 (1922).
77. Id. at 627.
78. Id. at 628.
79. Kenyon, supra note 12, at 467.
80. Id. at 465. See also I. Kerlin, MORAL IMBEcILITY in ROSEN, ET AL., 1 THE HISTORY OF
MENTAL RETARDATION 304-310 (1976).
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among them unusually high."81
Once again, the American Neurological Association responded to
this fear. "The reputedly high fecundity of the mentally defective
groups ... is a myth based on the assumption that those who are
low in the cultural scale are also mentally and biologically defec-
tive." 2 A more recent authority concludes, "Mental retardates
share ... the popular perception of 'less-than-humanness' and
likewise become the target and repository of a cluster of fears that
are felt to assault our humanness in general. Among these fears,
unabated sexual appetite ranks high."8"
One authority suggests that society's own myths and fears con-
cerning sex have been amplified and projected onto the develop-
mentally disabled individual." Because of this fear, society has
forced the developmentally disabled individual to deny his/her
sexuality. When the individual naturally could not deny this part
of humanhood and consequently showed signs of sexual develop-
ment, society conceptualized and treated the individual-and the
group as a whole-as a "sexual monster." 85
To summarize, the eugenicists argue that non-consensual sterili-
zation is needed to retard the deterioration of the race caused by
mental inferiority passed to future generations by a rapidly propa-
gating group of defectives. This thesis is fundamentally unsound,
and as such, cannot support legislative determinations or findings
of a compelling state interest.
Environmental-Although the compulsory sterilization statutes
originated under eugenic concepts, a more recent justification for
involuntary sterilization is premised upon the alleged unfitness of
the developmentally disabled person for parenthood.86 The claim
81. Bligh, supra note 5, at 1060 (quoting KANSAS, GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON PROVISION
FOR THE FEEBLE-MINDED, REPORT ON THE KALLIKAKS OF KANSAS 6-14 (1919)). The superin-
tendent of the Florida Farm Colony for Epileptic and Feeble-Minded reported to the gover-
nor in 1922: "The feeble-minded girl who is allowed to grow up with a lack of restraint and
supervision will almost surely become immoral." SECOND BIENNIAL REPORT OF THE SUPERIN-
TENDENT OF THE FLORIDA FARM COLONY FOR EPILEPTIC AND FEEBLE-MINDED 16 (1922).
82. Ferster, supra note 16, at 602 (quoting COMMITTEE OF AMERICAN NEUROLOGICAL As-
SOCIATION, EUGENICAL STERILIZATION 57 (1936). Accord, LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF CA-
NADA, supra note 5, at 46-47, discussing chart (CONLEY, THE EcONOMICs OF MENTAL RETAR-
DATION 1973) which disputes the claim that the mentally retarded reproduce at a higher
rate. Contra, SLOVENKO, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR AND THE LAW 101-02 (1965).
83. Roos, supra note 3, at 64.
84. Perske, About Sexual Development: An Attempt to be Human With the Mentally
Retarded, 11 MzENTAL RETARDATION 6-7 (1973), quoted in Howley, supra note 5, at 24.
85. HOWLEY, supra note 5, at 25.
86. A state may substitute new justifications for statutes enacted on the basis of out-
dated assumptions. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 190-91 (1973).
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that developmentally disabled persons do not make good parents
and, thus, cannot provide a good environment for the upbringing
of any children, has become quite prevalent in social and judicial
thought.
Though it does not necessarily follow that the children of defec-
tive parents will themselves be defective, they are liable to be ex-
posed to the miseries and hardships of being brought up by a
mother or father incapable of self-control who will almost cer-
tainly neglect them, and who may, by reason of mental instability
and ungovernable temper, aggravate by cruelty the results of ig-
norance and neglect.87
As with the eugenics theory, the assumptions underlying the
parental fitness theory of non-consensual sterilization are subject
to attack. "State laws which single out the mentally retarded as
being specially unsuited for parenthood are often derived more
from community fear and prejudice than from any sensible convic-
tion regarding the particular incapabilities of the retarded as a
group. '8e
The correlation between developmental disability and parental
unfitness is far from clear. Empirical studies have shown that per-
sons who are mildly or moderately retarded (a classification which
accounts for ninety percent of all retarded persons),6 ' are capable
of fulfilling parental responsibilities. Developmental disability does
not preclude the capacity for warmth and affection, characteristics
which are perhaps more determinative of good parenting than in-
telligence." Dr. Leo Kanner observes:
87. WILLIAMS, THz SANCTITY OF LnI AND THE CRIMINAL LAw 85 (1957). For support of
the environmental theory, see Pitts, Sexual Sterilization: A New Rationale? 26 ARK. L. REV.
353 (1972).
88. Price and Burt, Sterilization, State Action, and the Concept of Consent, 1 LAw &
PSYCH. REv. 57, 63 (1975).
89. Murdock, supra note 61, at 933 and 934 n.89 (citing NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR RE-
TARDED CHILDREN, FACTS ON MENTAL RETARDATION 4 (1971)). Heber estimates that the per-
centage of educable developmentally disabled persons is seventy to eighty percent of the
total developmentally disabled population. LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA, supra note
5, at 14 (quoting HEsER, EPIDEMIOLOGY OF MENTAL RETARDATION (1970)).
90. A program which uses intelligence as a basis for determining parental fitness must
take into account the imprecision of the testing process, as well as the possibility of cultural
bias in the testing procedure. Murdock, supra note 61, at 928-29. See generally WOODY,
LEGAL ASPECTS OF MENTAL RETARDATION: A SEARCH FOR RELIABILITY (1974) for a discussion
of the unreliability of the classification system. See also Chez, Mental Disability as a Basis
for Contraception and Sterilization, 18 SOCIAL BIOLOGY 5120-26 (Supplement) (1971), for
the view that I.Q. should not be a criterion for parenting.
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In my 20 years of psychiatric work with thousands of children
and their parents, I have seen percentually at least as many 'in-
telligent' adults unfit to rear their offspring as I have seen such
'feeble-minded' adults. I have-and many others have-come to
the conclusion that, to a large extent independent of the I.Q.,
fitness for parenthood is determined by emotional involvements
and relationships.9 1
Non-consensual sterilization of developmentally disabled per-
sons based on a presumption of parental unfitness may be consti-
tutionally defective for over-inclusiveness, 9 because not all persons
in the group, not even a substantial minority, are parentally unfit.
In addition, as was the case with the eugenic justification, statutes
based upon an environmental theory may be under-inclusive 3 as
well, for parental unfitness is by no means limited to the develop-
mentally disabled.
Therapeutic-A third justification for compulsory sterilization is
that the procedure and its effects are therapeutic for the patient,
that "sterilization is to the advantage of the person sterilized, and,
at least in the case of females, is actually welcomed.""
At the outset, one must make a distinction between what may be
termed legitimate therapeutics and those reasons which fail to
reach a level of legitimacy. Sterilization as a therapeutic measure
may be legitimately necessary in three instances in order to protect
the physical health of the patient: (1) diseases which make preg-
nancy dangerous for the mother; (2) diseases which make it proba-
ble that a pregnancy will result in a still-born; and (3) cases of
frequent pregnancies which increase the probability of complica-
tions with subsequent births.9 These can be properly viewed as
instances where the state is acting for the retarded patient."
91. Bligh, supra note 5, at 1062 (quoting KANNER, A MINIATURE TEXTBOOK OF FEBZ-
MINDEDNESS, 4-5 (1949)).
92. Murdock, supra note 61, at 931-32.
93. Id.
94. WLAMS, supra note 87, at 86.
95. LAw REFORM COMMSSION OF CANADA, supra note 5, at 31.
96. The state may act under its parens patriae power solely in the best interest of the
individual concerned. Two theories have developed as to how the parens patriae power
should be exercised. Under the "best interest" theory, the court balances the personal bene-
fits and detriments to the developmentally disabled individual in arriving at its decision.
Under the "substitute judgment" doctrine, the court acts as it perceives the disabled person
would act if competent to decide. See generally Gauvey and Shuger, The Permissibility of
Involuntary Sterilization Under the Parens Patriae and Police Power Authority of the
State: In re Sterilization of Moore, 6 MD. L.F. 109, 112-16 (1976). Under either theory, the
decision to sterilize in these three situations would be warranted.
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Along with these legitimate therapeutic justifications, however,
are less valid reasons for sterilization "for the benefit of the pa-
tient," where the state, under the guise of a therapeutic motiva-
tion,97 is doing unwelcomed things to the patient.
Sterilization makes such beings more tractable, like the gelding of
the ox or the horse, that they become more amenable to treat-
ment, and that, therefore, far from being an injury, the slight and
nearly painless operation required improves physical vigor and
makes the patient contented and happy."e
Two authorities in 1931 advocated compulsory sterilization of
two groups of developmentally disabled persons for two distinct
reasons: the "high-grade retardate" for the prevention of mental
deficiency, and the "low-grade imbecile" for the discouragement of
"obscene habits." e For this second group of individuals, the au-
thorities claimed sterilization successfully stifled "disgustingly ob-
scene" masturbatory habits, and alleviated habits which were
"worse during menstrual cycle."100
It is sometimes asserted that the patient is rewarded by eugenic
sterilization because it allows more handicapped persons to leave
segregated institutional life, freeing up more of the state's re-
sources which can then be spent on the individual patient's
welfare.' 0 '
Implicit in the therapeutic justifications of the past is the mis-
perception that developmentally disabled persons do not mind
sterilization, but "accept sterilization blandly."' 1 2 As Justice
Holmes in Buck v. Bell stated, sterilization is "often not felt to be
[a sacrifice] . . . by those concerned." 03 The fallacy of this view is
97. KIrrRi, supra note 27, at 334.
98. KENYON, supra note 12, at 467.
99. E.A. Whitney and M.M. Schick, Some Results of Selective Sterilization in ROSEN,
supra note 5, at 202-10.
100. Id. at 206.
101. Gray, Compulsory Sterilization in a Free Society: Choices and Dilemmas, 41 CIN.
L. REv. 529, 585 (1972). In advocating compulsory sterilization, the superintendent of the
Florida Farm Colony for Epileptic and Mentally Deficient Children rationalized:
It would seem that many of our patients could then be cared for on the outside,
whereas, at the present time, we cannot afford to release them. Considerable ex-
pense in their care would be thus avoided and they would be able to enjoy living
in greater freedom than when confined to an institution.
TENTH BIENNIAL REPORT OF FLORIDA FARM COLONY FOR EPILEPTIC AND MENTALLY DEFICIENT
CHILDREN 12 (1939).
102. Roos, supra note 3, at 50.
103. 274 U.S. at 207.
19811
622 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:599
revealed by several psychological studies, including that by Sabagh
and Edgerton,' the first study in which sterilized patients were
asked to express their feelings. Among the typical responses were
these:
I'd like to have one or two kids but not a whole lot. I take care of
everybody else's kids and everybody tells me I'm good with chil-
dren and they ask me why I don't have one of my own and I just
say that I can't have one.1 "
Gee, I sure would like to have a baby.... They never told me
that they were going to do that surgery to me. They said they
were going to remove my appendix and then they did that other.
They should have explained to me .... After they did that sur-
gery to me, I cried. . . .I still don't know why they did that sur-
gery to me. The sterilization wasn't for punishment, was it? Was
it because there was something wrong with my mind?'"
Although such responses may not be used as empirical evidence of
competence and parental fitness, they tend to refute the myth of
patient acceptance of or indifference toward forced sterilization.
Researchers have found that involuntarily sterilized persons
tend to perceive sterilization as a symbol of reduced or degraded
status,10 7 of punishment synonomous in their minds with castra-
tion,10 8 and of self as deviant and unworthy of parental rights.' "
Fiscal-With increasing frequency, economic considerations play
a role in the struggle to legitimize a non-consensual sterilization
scheme. The economic justification for sterilization can be summa-
rized as follows:
As our society becomes more technologically sophisticated and
demands more and more freedom from discomfort, the produc-
tion of each individual and the benefit-to-cost ratio of each ex-
penditure becomes increasingly important. On this scale, the
mentally [handicapped] are in direct competition for personnel
and funds with [other] programs."'
104. The study included forty patients who had been sterilized at Pacific State Hospital,
Pomona, California between 1931 and 1951. Sabagh and Edgerton, Sterilized Mental Defec-




107. LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA, supra note 5, at 50-51.
108. Roos, supra note 3, at 48.
109. LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA, supra note 5, at 49.
110. Id. at 29-30 (quoting Cooke, "Ethics and Law on Behalf of the Mentally Re-
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The proponents of this view conclude that since developmentally
disabled persons place a financial burden on the state greater than
the benefit they return, the state is justified in establishing policies
such as sterilization to reduce the financial burden they impose. "
Embodied in this justification is the feeling that "three generations
of welfare recipients is enough." '
Although this justification for sterilization is immune from anal-
ysis in terms of unscientific or unwarranted assumptions, it is easy
to perceive that this theory, too, stems from society's prejudicial
view of mentally handicapped persons as a "sub-human" or
"other-human" group. "The intolerance already exhibited by some
people to handicaps is expressed in a variety of ways, including the
view that having children is an indulgence which the public should
not have to finance." ' s
On one level, then, proponents of a fiscal theory of sterilization
stress the financial strain on the state which results from the dis-
abled individual's bearing and raising offspring and, thus, advocate
sterilization as a means of eliminating this financial burden. Per-
haps underlying this theory, however, is the more extreme eco-
nomic view that sterilization should be used as a means of elimi-
nating not only the financial burden associated with offspring who
may become dependents of the state, but of eventually eliminating
the entire group of financially burdensome individuals.
Abnormal individuals are not only valueless but are generally
harmful to society; for, beside being nonproducers, they absorb
the energies and the productive power of others. Hence, in the
development of a people it becomes necessary that the lifetime of
these abnormal individuals should be shortened....
[I]t is difficult to see why our moralists, our ethicists and our
economists do not unite in insisting upon a plan of treatment of
all the degenerates who come within the cognizance of our legal
and medical authorities, that shall conserve the best and highest
interests of society and at the same time co-operate with nature
in a speedy, effective, and painless removal of that class of indi-
viduals which public morality, Christian ethics, economics, and
tarded." 20(1) PEDIATRIC CLINICS OF NORTH AMERICA 260 (Feb. 1973).
111. Id.
112. KrrrmE, supra note 27, at 332. It is interesting to note that, historically, the num-
ber of non-consensual sterilizations performed has tracked national economic conditions.
The sterilization rate tends to increase during periods of economic downswings. Id.
113. LAw REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA, supra note 5, at 61.
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nature as well, have marked as unfit to survive.114
Conflicting legal authority exists as to whether the state may
properly take into account its financial interests when justifying an
interference with a fundamental individual right.115 Apart from
this question of positive law, however, is an equally or more impor-
tant question of political ideology and societal values: Are we as a
self-governing, liberal society to structure the allocation of rights
and to frame issues of social justice on the basis of a cost-benefit
scheme? " ' We must be willing to address this and similar ques-
tions, for an economic theory of sterilization is likely to gain added
support as other eugenic and environmental theories are thrown
into disrepute. "
b. Least Restrictive Alternative Analysis
When governmental action authorized by legislation infringes
upon a fundamental individual right, the action must not only be
necessary to achieve a compelling state interest, but must also be
the least drastic means of effectuating that interest; a statute can-
not withstand constitutional scrutiny if less drastic alternatives to
the state action are available but not utilized.118 The United States
Supreme Court has noted:
In a series of decisions this Court has held that, even though the
governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose
cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental per-
sonal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The
breadth of legislative abridgment must be viewed in the light of
less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose. "
When this principle is applied to the justifications for non-consen-
sual sterilization, it becomes evident that the statutes are unconsti-
tutional on this basis alone.
We have already discussed less drastic alternatives to steriliza-
114. K. Schwartz, supra note 2, at 150, 162-63.
115. See Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 161 (3d Cir. 1980). But see In re Steriliza-
tion of Moore, 221 S.E.2d 307, 312 (N.C. 1976).
116. See generally, B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LmERAL STATE (1980).
117. See, e.g., In re Sterilization of Moore, 221 S.E.2d 307, 312 (N.C. 1976).
118. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488
(1960); Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 161 (3d Cir. 1980).
119. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. at 488.
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tion available when a eugenic interest is controlling. 120 Genetic
counseling, education in the use of contraceptives, and utilization
of genetic testing devices are alternatives which must be explored
before sterilization is performed. And with developmental disabil-
ity which has as its basis purely environmental or both environ-
mental and genetic factors, a close monitoring and/or alleviation of
those factors may be sufficient.
Where sterilization is premised on a parental fitness theory, the
availability of supportive services to help deal with a wanted or
unwanted birth and the difficulties of parenting is a less drastic
alternative which must be explored.
Sterilization which is undertaken in part to ease the financial
burden of the state is subject to a more fundamental attack:
"[Sterilization is] especially repugnant in America's present state
of affluence. No such drastic curtailment of one's procreative power
is justified. . . until 'all reasonable attempts at improving the en-
vironment and rehabilitation of the disabled' have failed or until
'food and air shortages . . . become so severe that there might not
be enough to bear the burden of any further growth in
population.' ",211
2. "Natural" Right Theory
"A law as vital as this cannot be nullified by a simple appeal to
the emotions, nor by a sentimental cry about the helplessness of
degenerates. The real answer to sterilization adherents will not
be found in drooling speeches of social workers; it will be found
at the base of the American system, in the eternal principles of
good government."122
Proponents of a second legal theory concerning the constitution-
ality of compulsory sterilization statutes address axiologically the
nature of the right and the intrusion involved in sterilization, and
conclude that regardless of the scientific validity of its underlying
precepts, the need for compulsory sterilization can never amount
to a compelling state interest for which such an intrusion would be
justified. These proponents use as their starting place Justice
120. See text accompanying notes 67-70 supra.
121. KrrruE, supra note 27, at 328-29.
122. Ruddy, Compulsory Sterilization: An Unwarranted Extension of the Powers of
Government, 3 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1, 10 (1927).
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Holmes' logic, or illogic, in Buck v. Bell.123 Many feel that the deci-
sion "is the product of a juristic philosophy in complete discord
with that on which our principles of law and government are
founded. Although the case is [fifty-five] years old it might really
be considered a recent case in view of the age of the tradition of
liberty which it abruptly scrapped. 1 24
a. Vaccination Analogy
"The principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad
enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes.'25
Followers of a deductive, natural law tradition think not. The
medical procedures involved in the respective medical exercises of
state power are drastically dissimilar. 2 6 Vaccination involves a
much less intrusive invasion of one's rights than does steriliza-
tion.12 7 In addition, the effectiveness of vaccination to accomplish
its stated purpose without danger to the individual had been
demonstrated by careful analysis and experimentation.1 28
When the constitutionality of the Massachusetts compulsory
vaccination statute was upheld by the state supreme court in
1903129 and affirmed by the United States Supreme Court in
1905180 as being a valid exercise of the state's police power, the
Massachusetts Supreme Court said:
If a person should deem it important that vaccination should not
be performed in his case, and the authorities should think other-
wise, it is not in their power to vaccinate him by force, and the
worst that could happen to him under the statute would be the
payment of the penalty of five dollars.31
Justice Holmes failed to apply the vaccination analogy correctly to
compulsory sterilization, for with compulsory sterilization, a non-
123. 274 U.S. 200 (1927). See text accompanying notes 19-22 supra.
124. Gest, Eugenic Sterilization: Justice Holmes vs. Natural Law, 23 TasuLiE L.Q. 306
(1949-50).
125. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. at 207.
126. Burgdorf, supra note 20, at 1009.
127. Id.
128. Id. See also O'Hara and Sanks, Eugenic Sterilization, 45 Gao. L.J. 20, 30 n.68
(1956) (quoting MONTAVON, EUGENIC STEmLIZATION IN THE LAWS OF THE STATES 24 (1930)).
129. Commonwealth v. Pear, 66 N.E. 719 (Mass. 1903), aff'd, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
130. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
131. Commonwealth v. Pear, 66 N.E. at 722.
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consenting individual does not have the luxury of choosing to pay
a monetary fine.
b. War Analogy
"We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call
upon the best citizens for their lives. " 2
Once again Justice Holmes uses analogy to support the Court's
holding that compulsory sterilization is within the state's police
power. But as with the vaccination analogy, this wartime analogy
proves faulty. Wartime service may be justifiable in situations of
necessity and urgency to insure the physical safety of citizens, "3
but such necessity is lacking in the case of sterilization.
c. Harmful Logic
"The difference between the evil wrought by a polite merchant
and that by an uncouth robber is one of manners only. Both
types of men are inimical to society; should not both therefore be
sterilized?""
Adherents to the legal view that compulsory sterilization could
never be justified as achieving a compelling state interest express
concern over the logical extension of the rationale underlying ster-
ilization. The rationale could lead to a "systematic elimination of
imperfect . . . specimens of humanity,"13 5 action in line with the
philosophy of the absolute state. " 6
The danger of the rationale or logic underlying forced steriliza-
tion can take one of two forms. There is the dangerous possibility
of a non-consensual sterilization program being extended to in-
clude other societal groups which, like the developmentally dis-
abled, are the recipients of misperceptions and prejudice. Justice
Douglas, writing for the Court in Skinner v. Oklahoma,1 3 7 recog-
nized the danger:
132. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. at 207.
133. Burgdorf, supra note 20, at 1008. See also O'Hara and Sanks, supra note 129, at 29-
30.
134. Ruddy, supra note 122, at 3.
135. Id. at 8.
136. Gest, supra note 124, at 309.
137. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
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The power to sterilize... may have subtle, far-reaching and dev-
astating effects. In evil and reckless hands it can cause races or
types which are inimical to the dominant group to wither and
disappear."' 8
The New Jersey Supreme Court echoed the fear in Smith v. Board
of Examiners of Feeble-Minded,18 9 where the court held New
Jersey's sterilization statute violative of equal protection of the
laws:
[T]he decision . . . carries with it certain logical consequences,
having far-reaching results. For the feeble-minded and epileptics
are not the only persons in the community whose elimination as
undesirable citizens would, or might in the judgment of the Legis-
lature, be a distinct benefit to society. If the enforced sterility of
this class be a legitimate exercise of governmental power, a wide
field of legislative activity and duty is thrown open to which it
would be difficult to assign a legal limit.140
The fear expressed in these decisions and by other legal authori-
ties is not without basis. In 1922, eugenicists published a Model
Eugenic Sterilization Law which advocated the forced sterilization
of such groups as "orphans, ne'er-do-wells, the homeless, tramps
and paupers."1 4 1 Likewise, in 1929, C. E. Ballew introduced in the
55th General Assembly of Missouri Legislators a bill for steriliza-
tion of those "convicted of murder (not in the heat of passion),
rape, highway robbery, chicken stealing, bombing, or theft of
138. Id. at 541.
139. 88 A. 963 (N.J. 1913).
140. Id. at 966.
141. The Model Eugenic Sterilization Law advocated sterilization of the
1) Feeble-minded
2) Insane (including the psychopathic)
3) Criminalistic (including the delinquent and wayward)
4) Epileptic
5) Inebriate (including drug-habitues)
6) Diseased (including the tuberculous, the syphiletics, the leprous, and others
with chronic infectious and legally segregable diseases)
7) Blind (including those with seriously impaired vision)
8) Deaf (including those with seriously impaired hearing)
9) Deformed (including the crippled) and
10) Dependent (including orphans, ne'er-do-wells, the homeless, tramps, and
paupers.)
Ferster, supra note 16, at 618 (quoting LAUGHLIN, EUGENICAL STERILIZATION IN THE UNITED
STATES 446-47 (1922)).
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automobiles. 14 2 And one need not look far for another tragic ex-
ample of the reality of this fear: Nazi Germany in the 1930's.
In his famous Carolene Products1 43 footnote, Justice Stone indi-
cated that the Court can give extraordinary constitutional protec-
tion not only to those interests expressed in the Constitution, but
also to those interests which are unlikely to receive adequate con-
sideration in the political process, specifically the interests of "dis-
crete and insular minorities" unable to form political alliances. 144
Such protection is certainly warranted in the compulsory steriliza-
tion context.
Another danger lies, not in the extension of sterilization to other
groups, but in the possibility of racial discrimination in the appli-
cation of a sterilization program. In a study of the operation of the
Eugenics Board of Alberta, Canada, the researcher 145 found a dis-
proportionately small number of persons of British and West Eu-
ropean descent presented to or approved by the Board for sterili-
zation. In addition, a disproportionately small number of British
citizens were actually sterilized. The reverse situation, however,
was discovered for persons of East European and Indian or Metis
ethnicity. Although citizens of such descent accounted for only
15.4 % of the Alberta population, they constituted 29.7 % of the
number of patients presented to and approved by the Board for
sterilization, and 35.1 % of those actually sterilized. The re-
searcher postulates that the discriminatory practices mirrored the
current public attitude which, as shown by the immigration poli-
cies after World War I, reflected an anti-East European bias.1 46 He
sums up his findings:
Persons presented to and approved for sterilization by the Board
occupied socially vulnerable positions. They tended to be female
rather than male, young and inexperienced rather than mature,
not employed and dependent rather than self-supporting, em-
ployed in the low status rather than prestigious jobs, residents of
small towns rather than cities, members of ethnic minorities
rather than the dominant ethnic group, single rather than mar-
142. Bligh, supra note 5, at 1063.
143. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152, n.4 (1938).
144. Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 933
(1973).
145. Christian, "The Mentally Ill and Human Rights in Alberta: A Study of the Alberta
Sexual Sterilization Act," 1974. Unpublished paper (cited in LAw REFORM COMMISSION OF
CANADA, supra note 5, at 42-45).
146. Id. at 44-45.
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ried, and had been defined as sexual deviants. 147
Although this author has not uncovered similarly extensive studies
in the United States, the Canadian study highlights the socio-po-
litical consequences which may potentially result from any pro-
gram of compulsory sterilization.
III. CONSENSUAL STERILIZATION UNDER STATUTORY AUTHORITY
In the preceding sections, this comment has argued that sterili-
zation performed pursuant to compulsory or non-consensual steril-
ization legislation is a gross invasion of the developmentally dis-
abled individual's constitutionally protected privacy right,
unsupported by any compelling state interest. Many authorities to
date have strongly advocated the repeal of these compulsory stat-
utes. 48 But just as the decision by a developmentally disabled citi-
zen to have children should be protected, so, too, should his/her
right not to have children be protected. 149 The option of steriliza-
tion should be as equally available to the competently consenting
developmentally disabled individual as it is to other individuals.
Sterilization must also be made available to those individuals inca-
pable of consent who need sterilization for therapeutic reasons, as
well as to those individuals whose retardation makes the birthing
and parenting of children objectively impossible.
Once we discard compulsory sterilization as a constitutionally-
infirm scheme, at least two alternatives remain: sterilization per-
formed with consent under a consensual sterilization statute, and
sterilization performed with consent under judicial authority. This
section of this comment will examine these alternatives.
[J]ust as society has been plagued by its fear of procreation by
the mentally retarded. . . , so also has society harbored a fear of
empowering the state to engage in a program of eugenics....
States may merely substitute techniques more palatable than
compulsory sterilization to achieve much the same result.1'0
Two problems which are inherent in a consensual sterilization
147. Id. at 45.
148. Many groups advocate complete repeal, including the American Civil Liberties
Union Board of Directors and the American Bar Foundation on the Rights of the Mentally
Ill. BRAKEL, supra note 17, at 209.
149. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
150. Price and Burt, supra note 88, at 66.
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scheme must be understood and overcome in order that consensual
sterilization not become a "more palatable" but equally dangerous
form of compulsory sterilization. First, the concept and reality of
consent, both by the developmentally disabled individual and by a
sufficient third party, must be analyzed to insure that to the great-
est extent possible, sterilization is performed on the basis of the
patient's true desire, not on the basis of institutional or parental
convenience. Second, the traditional view that consensual sacrifices
of liberty are subject to less constitutional protection than are sac-
rifices of liberty compelled by the state15 1 must be abandoned in
the sterilization context in order to protect the developmentally
disabled individual.
A. Analysis of Present Statutes
Presently, nine states have consensual sterilization statutes.1 5
As non-consensual sterilization continues to lose support, the num-
ber of consensual statutes may continue to increase.
1. Procedure
Of the nine consensual sterilization statutes, only the Colorado
statute requires the consent of the patient before the sterilization
can be performed.15 8 In all others, third-party consent is sufficient.





The requirements vary as to who may initiate the sterilization
proceedings. The patient, parent or relative, physician (Connecti-
cut, Maine, Oregon, Vermont, Virginia), Commissioner of Public
Welfare (Minnesota), or an interested party (Connecticut, Oregon)
may petition for sterilization. Seven of the statutes provide for a
hearing (Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Minnesota, New Jersey,
Oregon, Virginia), at which hearing only three statutes provide
151. Burns, Wyatt v. Aderholt: Constitutional Standards for Statutory and Consensual
Sterilization in State Mental Institutions, 1 LAW & PSYCH. REV. 79, 86 (1975).
152. COLO. REV. STAT., §§ 27-10.5-128--27-10.5-132 (1980 Supp.); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 45-78p--z (1981 Supp.); GA. CODE ANN. § 84-931-936 (1979); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34,
§§ 2461-2468 (1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 256.07-.09 (1971), 252A.13 (1981 Supp.); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 30.4-24.2 (1981). ORE. REV. STAT. § 436.010-.150 (1979); VA. CODE §
54.325.9-.15 (1981). VT. STAT. ANN. §§ 18-8701-8704 (1968).
153. COLO. REV. STAT. § 27-10.5-128 (1980 Supp.). The Connecticut statute provides that
if the patient cannot give competent consent, no such sterilization shall be performed until a
court determination of consent or upon a showing that the operation is in the best interest
of the person. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-78q (1981 Supp.).
154. ORE. REV. STAT. § 436.110 (1979).
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that the patient must be present and may present and cross-ex-
amine witnesses on his/her own behalf (Colorado, Connecticut,
New Jersey).
2. Justification for Sterilization
Of the five consensual sterilization statutes which expressly state
the theory upon which they are based, three are eugenic in purpose
(Maine, Oregon, Vermont), and two are based on an environmental
justification (Georgia, Oregon).
3. Standards and Burdens of Proof
As was the case with non-consensual sterilization statutes, the
standards which must be met before sterilization can be ordered
vary greatly. The consensual portion of Maine's statute requires a
finding that sterilization will prevent the "reproduction of further
feeblemindedness."I55 The Vermont statute delineates more stan-
dards which must be met:
1. patient is likely to procreate defective offspring unless
sterilized;
2. health of patient will not be injured by the operation; and
3. the welfare of the person and the public will be improved
by the operation.'"
Four statutes explicate the applicable burden of proof and on
whom the burden falls. Connecticut and Virginia require the peti-
tioner to prove by clear and convincing evidence the necessity of
sterilization.1 57 In Georgia, a legal preponderance of evidence stan-
dard is used.1 58 The Oregon statute shifts the burden entirely to
the patient to show cause why an order of sterilization should not
be entered. 8 9
B. Prerequisites for Valid Patient Consent
When sterilization is performed pursuant to the patient's own
155. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 34, § 2461 (1978).
156. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 8702 (1968).
157. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-78y (West 1981 Supp.); VA. CODE § 54-325.12 (1981).
158. GA. CODE ANN. § 84-933(b)(iv) (1979). A "clear, strong and convincing" burden of
proof may be constitutionally required. See North Carolina Ass'n for Retarded Children v.
State, 420 F. Supp. 451, 457 (M.D.N.C. 1976); In re Guardianship of Hayes, 608 P.2d 635,
641 (Wash. 1980).
159. ORE. Rav. STAT. § 436.041 (1979).
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consent, that consent must be examined to insure that it reflects
the true desire of the developmentally disabled individual. In order
for the consent of a developmentally disabled individual to be
taken as valid and controlling, three elements should exist. The
consent must be given: (1) voluntarily, (2) after full disclosure of
all relevant considerations, and (3) by a person competent to make
such a decision.16
The voluntariness requirement assumes an exercise of free will
and the absence of any coercive or influential measures. "[T]he
word voluntary is frequently a mere subterfuge, in that it is often a
condition of discharge from the institution that the patient be ster-
ilized, and consequently the individual involved is in the position
of being confined or confinable until he gives his consent for sterili-
zation, which hardly makes the bargain free and equal and nullifies
the real meaning of the word voluntary." 16' "[T]he coercive feature
is hardly masked by the fictive option of sterilization or life impris-
onment."1 ' Sterilization which is made a ticket to noninstitution-
alized life or a precondition to welfare payments1" cannot be clas-
sified as truly voluntary.
Valid consent is informed. It is based upon knowledge and infor-
mation received concerning all pertinent factors: purpose and na-
ture of the operation, irreversibility of effect, other potential medi-
cal and emotional consequences, available options, etc. A complete
explanation of these factors should be given by an objective third-
party.
A voluntary and informed consent can only be rendered by one
competent to make a decision concerning sterilization. Competency
presupposes an ability to comprehend the nature and conse-
160. LAw REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA, supra note 5, at 75. See also Comment, Ster-
ilization of Mental Defectives: Compulsion and Consent, 27 BAYLOR L. REv. 174, 187-90
(1975).
161. Ferster, supra note 16, at 621 (quoting COMMrrTEE OF THE AMERICAN NEUROLOGICAL
ASSOCIATION, EUGENICAL STERILIZATION 7-8 (1935)).
162. State v. Cavitt, 157 N.W.2d 171, 179 (Neb. 1968) (Smith, J., dissenting).
163. Some state legislatures have attempted to make sterilization a prerequisite to wel-
fare payments to mothers of illegitimate children. KrrriE, supra note 27, at 332. See In re
Andrada, 33 U.S.L.W. 3278, cert. denied, 380 U.S. 953 (1965) and People v. Tapia, No.
73313 (Santa Barbara Super. Ct., July 7, 1965), cases in which persons on welfare who were
convicted of crimes were offered lower sentences or probation in return for submission to
sterilization. But see 42 U.S.C. § 300a-8 (1975), prohibiting any employee of a state which
administers any program supplemented by federal financial assistance from coercing or en-
deavoring to coerce "any person to undergo. . . sterilization ...by threatening such per-
son with the loss of, or disqualification for the receipt of, any benefit or service under a
program receiving Federal financial assistance."
1981]
634 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:599
quences of sterilization, as well as an ability to give or withhold
consent after personal calculation and deliberation. Developmental
disability is not co-extensive with a lack of competency to make
such a decision.1" One authority suggests that the state will rarely
confront a situation in which the retarded individual should be
sterilized but lacks the capacity to consent.1" Care should be exer-
cised to insure that those who are capable of making the decision
concerning sterilization do so.
C. Inadequacy of Third-Party Consent
Because all but one of the consensual sterilization statutes allow
for the substituted consent of a parent, relative, or guardian, it is
necessary to examine and understand the inadequacies of third-
party consent in order to learn how best to overcome the
deficiencies.
Traditionally, parental consent has been sufficient to authorize
medical care for a minor child when medical assistance is necessary
to further the child's best interests,1 " subject to limited interfer-
ence by the state acting in its parens patriae capacity to protect
those who are unable to protect themselves.1 67 The traditional ba-
sis for parental control over medical treatment of a minor child
may be insufficient in the sterilization context, for more often than
not, sterilization of a developmentally disabled child is not medi-
cally necessary to insure or maintain the health of the child.
The parent of a developmentally disabled child may believe he
or she is consenting to the non-therapeutic sterilization procedure
in one of two capacities or for one of two reasons.6 8 First, most
parents would believe that their consent is in the best physical and
emotional interests of their child. Conflicts of interests, however,
are inherent in such a situation."" The fear of being burdened with
the responsibilities of a new child, as well as the apprehension
which may accompany the sexual development of a developmen-
164. Murdock, supra note 61, at 933.
165. Id. at 934. Murdock suggests that with those few individuals who cannot compe-
tently consent, many are incapable of reproduction or remain in protected environments,
making sterilization unnecessary.
166. See 74 A.L.R.3d 1224. See generally R. MNOOKIN, supra note 66 at 341-446 (1978).
167. In re Grady, 426 A.2d 467, 479-81 (N.J. 1981). See generally Gauvey and Shuger,
supra note 96.
168. See note 96 supra.
169. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Ruby v. Massey, 452 F. Supp.
361, 366 (D. Conn. 1978); Mnookin, supra note 66, at 362-63. Contra Parham v. J.R., 442
U.S. 584 (1979).
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tally disabled child, while both legitimate emotions and concerns,
contribute to the reality that the "benefit" resulting from steriliza-
tion may accrue more to the parent than to the child.1 70 Second,
the parent may consent to fulfill a presumption of the minor's own
wishes. While substituted parental consent may be legally and
morally appropriate in circumstances with less potentially harmful
results, parental consent in this non-therapeutic sterilization con-
text is less legitimate, for it may not be easily presumed that the
child, upon reaching majority, would choose sexual sterilization for
him/herself.17 1
Traditionally, the law does not give the parent any inherent con-
trol over the person or property of a child of majority age.1 71 In
situations where the major child is incompetent, a court-appointed
guardian can make decisions on the ward's behalf concerning per-
sonal and financial affairs. But the considerations surrounding pa-
rental consent to the sterilization of a minor child are relevant here
as well. Should the guardian be allowed to consent to a deprivation
of the ward's fundamental rights when sterilization is not dictated
by a legitimate therapeutic need?
D. Paradigm: The Connecticut Statute
While recognizing that the use of unfettered third-party consent
must be carefully controlled, it is necessary to insure that those
developmentally disabled persons who cannot give competent con-
sent but who truly desire or need sterilization be given the freedom
to exercise that choice. Connecticut has sought to balance these
concerns in its consensual sterilization procedure. Connecticut's is
by far the most creative and protective of all the consensual sterili-
zation statutes. For that reason, it deserves examination in detail.
The requirements of the Connecticut statute are as follows:
170. See North Carolina Ass'n for Retarded Children v. State, 420 F. Supp. 451, 456
(M.D.N.C. 1976) ("We think such confidence in all next of kin and all legal guardians is
misplaced, and that the unstated premises of competency to decide to force initiation of the
proceeding and never failing fidelity to the interest of the retarded person are invalid.") But
see, In re Sterilization of Moore, 221 S.E.2d 307, 316 (N.C. 1976) ("[Patient's] mother un-
questionably is in a position to know what is beat for the future of her child.") See Howley,
supra note 5, at 30-37, for a discussion of the attitudes of parents of developmentally dis-
abled children toward their children's sexual development, sexual expression, marriage, and
sterilization.
171. McCormick, Proxy Consent in the Experimentation Situation, in MNOOKIN, supra
note 66, at 429-31.
172. Holmes v. Powers, 439 S.W.2d 579 (Ky. 1968). See Soskin, Voluntary Steriliza-
tion-Safeguarding Freedom of Choice, 2 AMIcus 40, 43 (1977).
1981]
636 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:599
1. No person shall be sterilized unless that person is 18 years
or older and has given informed consent in writing to the
sterilization.
2. If the person is institutionalized, or if any physician has
reason to believe the person is unable to give informed consent, a
probate court must hold a hearing to determine the person's com-
petency to give consent. An application for such determination
may be filed by the patient, the attending physician, institution
director, or an interested party and shall state the reason for
seeking such determination.
3. Upon receipt of the application, the court sets a time and
place for the hearing. The hearing need not be in a courtroom if
another location would facilitate the presence of the patient.
4. Notice must be served on: a) the patient, b) institution di-
rector if applicable; c) parents of patient, d) spouse, if applicable,
e) siblings, if parents are deceased, f) the office of protection and
advocacy, and g) such other persons as the court may determine
have an interest in the patient.
5. The court shall appoint legal counsel to represent patient if
patient has not already selected counsel.
6. At the hearing, sworn written reports from an interdiscipli-
nary team of impartial panel members appointed by the court
from a panel of physicians, psychologists, educators, social and
residential workers who have personally observed or worked with
the patient must be submitted.
7. The patient shall be present at the hearing. The patient or
counsel may present evidence and cross-examine any witnesses.
8. If the court finds that the patient is unable to give in-
formed consent, or that the patient is under guardianship, the
court must determine whether sterilization is in the patient's best
interest. The court must find all of these factors to be present: a)
less drastic alternative contraceptive methods have proven un-
workable or inapplicable, b) the individual is physiologically ca-
pable of procreation, c) the individual has the capability and a
reasonable opportunity for sexual activity, and d) procreation
would endanger the life or severely impair the health of the
individual.
9. Even when the court finds the individual incompetent to
give consent and sterilization to be in the individual's best inter-
est, the individual can refuse sterilization, provided the court con-
cludes that the individual understands the nature and conse-
quences of such refusal.1 73
173. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-78p-z (West 1981 Supp.).
STERILIZATION
The Connecticut statute is unique in two respects. First, no
other consensual sterilization statute defines "best interest" in
terms of medical necessity or the physical and mental health of the
patient. This requirement insures against sterilization ordered on
the basis of third-party interests alone. Second, no other statute
allows the patient an opportunity to refuse sterilization once the
court has made its determination. Even though the Connecticut
statute could be more protective if it applied the hearing require-
ment to individuals under guardianship, it successfully reduces the
role of the consenting third party and maximizes consideration and
protection of the developmentally disabled patient.
IV. STERILIZATION WITHOUT STATUTORY AUTHORITY
In the past, courts have been extremely reluctant to order the
sterilization of developmentally disabled persons in the absence of
specific statutory authority.174 Courts have rejected contentions
that jurisdiction to order such procedures is impliedly conferred by
general enactments which empower the courts to act on behalf of
incompetent persons.17 5 Recognizing that sterilization irreversibly
denies to the developmentally disabled individual a fundamental
right, courts have expressed "a preference that the difficult deci-
sions regarding sterilization be made by a legislative body." 176
Increasingly, however, courts have accepted the task of ruling on
sterilization requests in the absence of controlling legislation. The
federal district court in Wyatt v. Aderholt1 77 by implication recog-
nized the "inherent power of the. . . court 'to hear and determine
all matters legal and equitable in all proceedings known to the
common law' "178 when it issued guidelines for a sterilization proce-
dure after holding the Alabama statute unconstitutional. The
United States Supreme Court in Stump v. Sparkman,17' where a
woman who had been nonconsensually sterilized as a child brought
an action against the judge who issued the sterilization order, held
174. Wade v. Bethesda Hosp., 337 F. Supp. 671 (S.D. Ohio 1971); Hudson v. Hudson,
373 So. 2d 310 (Ala. 1979); A.L. v. G.R.H., 325 N.E.2d 501 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 936 (1976); In re Interest of M.K.R., 515 S.W.2d 467 (Mo. 1974); In re Guardian-
ship of Kemp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 758, 118 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1974); Frazier v. Levi, 440 S.W.2d 393
(Tex. Civ. App. 1969). See Annot. 74 A.L.R.3d 1210.
175. 74 A.L.R.3d 1210, 1213.
176. In re Guardianship of Hayes, 608 P.2d at 637.
177. 368 F. Supp. 1383 (M.D. Ala. 1974).
178. In re Guardianship of Hayes, 608 P.2d at 638 (quoting In re Hudson, 126 P.2d 765,
777 (Wash. 1942)).
179. 435 U.S. 349 (1978).
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that the judge was immune from suit because he "was a member of
a court which had broad jurisdiction at law and in equity, and
which was not prohibited from considering a petition for steriliza-
tion by either statute or controlling case law. '"18 In addition, state
courts in New York,181 New Jersey,18 2 Ohio, 88 Maryland, 84 Wash-
ington, 85 and Alaska"8 have explicitly recognized such inherent
judicial power.
Courts that have reviewed sterilization requests on the basis of
their inherent authority have generally required the petitioner to
satisfy a much heavier standard of proof than have courts acting
under statutory authority. 87 Before discussing why such might be
the case, let us look at two exemplary decisions by courts acting
pursuant to inherent judicial authority which explicate this heavy
standard of proof: Wyatt v. Aderholt 88 and In re Guardianship of
Hayes.'89 Although the courts take somewhat different approaches
to the factfinding process, the Wyatt court utilizing the mechanism
of committee review and the Hayes court acting as sole factfinder,
both schemes highlight the paramount concern for and protection
of the developmentally disabled individual.
The United States District Court in Wyatt recognized the fal-
lacy of consensual sterilization when based on the consent of one
other than the patient, and the danger involved when consent is
made a trade-off for full constitutional protection. The court
promulgated "adequate standards and procedural safeguards to in-
sure that all future sterilization be performed only where the full
panoply of constitutional protections has been accorded to the in-
dividuals involved,"' 190 discarding the notion that only non-consen-
sual action by the state required full constitutional protection.
The Wyatt guidelines provide that the written consent of the
institutionalized resident, as certified by the facility director, must
be (a) based upon an understanding of the nature and conse-
180. Id. at 358.
181. In re Sallmaier, 85 Misc. 2d 295, 378 N.Y.S.2d 989 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
182. In re Grady, 426 A.2d 467 (N.J. 1981).
183. In re Simpson, 180 N.E.2d 206 (Ohio P. Ct. 1962).
184. Ex parte Eaton, Baltimore Cir. Ct. Nov. 11, 1954.
185. In re Guardianship of Hayes, 608 P.2d 635.
186. In re C.D.M., 627 P.2d 607 (Alaska 1981).
187. Compare standards of consensual sterilization statutes, text supra accompanying
notes 155 and 156 with standards delineated in Hayes and Grady, text accompanying notes
193-96 supra.
188. 368 F. Supp. 1383 (M.D. Ala. 1974).
189. 608 P.2d 635.
190. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 368 F. Supp. at 1384.
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quences of sterilization, (b) given by a person competent to make
such a decision, and (c) given voluntarily, free from any implied or
expressed coercion. Next, the consent is reviewed by a committee
consisting of five members from various professional and personal
backgrounds.191 The committee is to review medical, social, and
psychological information concerning the resident and interview
the resident as well as other concerned individuals to determine
whether the resident has given his/her informed consent.
If the resident is legally incompetent, and/or if the facility direc-
tor cannot certify that the resident understands the nature and
consequences of sterilization, the review committee must then de-
termine whether the resident has voluntarily formed a genuine de-
sire to be sterilized. Only when the committee finds that such gen-
uine desire exists and that sterilization is in the best interest of the
resident can sterilization be approved. A determination of best in-
terest must take into account possible alternative birth control
methods, and "shall not be made on the basis of institutional con-
venience or purely administrative considerations."'192 The commit-
tee's decision that sterilization is in the best interest of the resi-
dent is then reviewed by a court of competent jurisdiction.
The Wyatt safeguards are designed to insure fully informed con-
sent. When the resident is incapable of providing such consent,
however, the Wyatt guidelines still allow for patient participation
by requiring a determination of the patient's genuine desire,
thereby maximizing the freedom of personal choice.
The Supreme Court of Washington recently decided a case in
which the mother of a mentally retarded minor petitioned the
court for an order appointing her as guardian of the minor and
authorizing the minor's sterilization. In In re Guardianship of
Hayes,' the court held that the mother had not shown by clear,
cogent, and convincing evidence that the procedure was in the best
interest of the minor. After elaborating upon the inherent power of
the court to decide the issue, the supreme court provided stan-
dards to guide the lower courts when exercising their jurisdiction.
All of the following standards must be met before a sterilization
order can be entered:
191. At least one member is to be a licensed attorney, at least two shall be women, at
least two shall be minority group members, and at least one shall be a resident of the insti-
tution where the patient lives. Id. at 1384-85.
192. Id. at 1384.
193. 608 P.2d 635.
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I. [T]he individual is incapable of making his or her own
decision about sterilization, and
II. [Tihe individual is unlikely to develop sufficiently to
make an informed judgment about sterilization in the
foreseeable future.
III. [T]here is a need for contraception.
A. [Tihe individual is physically capable of procreation,
and
B. [T]he individual is likely to engage in sexual activity
at the present or in the near future under
circumstances likely to result in pregnancy.
IV. [T]he nature and extent of individual's disability, ...
renders him or her permanently incapable of caring for
child, even with reasonable assistance.
V. [T]here is no alternative to sterilization.
A. [A]ll less drastic contraceptive methods, including
supervision, education and training, have been
proved unworkable or inapplicable, and
B. [T]he proposed method of sterilization entails the
least invasion of the body of the individual.
1. [T]he current state of scientific and medical
knowledge does not suggest either
a. that a reversible sterilization procedure or
other less drastic contraceptive method will
shortly be available, or
b. that science is on the threshhold of an ad-
vance in the treatment of the individual's dis-
ability. 1"
The Washington court makes clear that "to the greatest extent
possible, the court [must elicit] and [take] into account the view of
the incompetent individual.' 195 The court must determine first
whether the developmentally disabled individual is capable of
making his or her own decision concerning sterilization. The heavy
presumption existing against sterilization of an individual incapa-
ble of informed consent must be overcome by the person request-
ing sterilization. The presumption is most heavy in the case of an
incompetent minor, "whose youth may make it difficult or impossi-
ble to prove by clear, cogent and convincing evidence that he or
she will never be capable of making an informed judgment about
sterilization or of caring for a child."1 "
194. Id. at 641.
195. Id.
196. Id. Another recent case, In re Grady, 426 A.2d 467 (N.J. 1981), in which the New
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The schemes delineated by the courts in Wyatt and Hayes re-
flect the potential for a more complete and careful assessment of
the developmentally disabled individual's needs when the court
acts pursuant to its inherent power rather than pursuant to the
authority that the legislature vests in it by enacting a sterilization
statute: With inherent power, the court is free to ignore the false
eugenic and environmental assumptions which have plagued state
legislators in the past. No longer is the court implementing some
vague societal interest in sterilization articulated by the appropri-
ate legislature; instead, the court is free to impose judicial stan-
dards which concentrate solely on the best interests of the develop-
mentally disabled individual, as an individual, not as a member of
a group which has been labeled inferior and set aside for mass
sterilization.
Recognizing its exclusive duty to insure that the patient is sub-
jected to sterilization only when the procedure is in the patient's
best interests, the court may feel greater power to deny a steriliza-
tion request when all evidentiary standards have not been met:
Our conclusion that superior courts have the power to grant a pe-
tition for sterilization does not mean that power must be exer-
cised. Sterilization touches upon the individual's right of privacy
and the fundamental right to procreate. It is an unalterable pro-
cedure with serious effects on the lives of the mentally retarded
person and those upon whom he or she may depend. Therefore, it
should be undertaken only after careful consideration of all rele-
Jersey Supreme Court acted on its own authority in ruling on a parental sterilization re-
quest, sets out in some detail the evidence standards which the petitioning parent must
meet before sterilization can be ordered:
1. the possibility that the patient can become pregnant;
2. the possibility that the individual will experience trauma or psychological
damage with pregnancy and birth or as a result of the sterilization operation;
3. the likelihood that the individual will voluntarily engage in sexual activity;
4. the inability of the individual to understand reproduction or contraception
and the likely permanence of that inability;
5. the feasibility and medical advisability of less drastic means of
contraception;
6. the advisability of sterilization at the present time rather than in the future;
7. the ability of the incompetent person to care for a child, or the possibility
that the individual may be able to marry and, with the spouse, care for a child;
8. the possibility that scientific or medical advances may occur alleviating the
necessity for sterilization;
9. a demonstration that the petitioners are seeking sterilization in good faith
and primarily for the best interests of the individual rather than for their own or
the public's convenience.
Id. at 483. See also In re C.D.M., 627 P.2d 607 (Hawaii 1981).
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vant factors.1
Additionally, in situations where the court acts pursuant to its
own authority, the developmentally disabled individual is assured
of receiving a full determination by a court experienced in resolv-
ing issues concerning the rights of citizens, no matter their capac-
ity,19s which is generally cognizant of the fundamental rights in-
volved in the sterilization context, a prospect which is lacking in
states where sterilization statutes provide for a hearing before a
non-judicial tribunal, as well as in those states which fail to pro-
vide for a hearing at all. In the early part of this century, a propo-
nent of eugenic sterilization wrote:
[T]here is the assumption that the board appointed ... will be
indifferent to its duty and malicious in the application of it....
It would be almost impossible for any appointing power to select
a board composed of surgeons and other practitioners of medicine
in which the majority could be of such character as to fulfill the
conditions feared.1"
Although the mechanism of a review committee can be extremely
helpful in providing general expertise in medical and sociological
matters and specific first-hand knowledge of the potential steriliza-
tion patient, there is no constitutional substitute for a full determi-
nation and final review by a competent court of law.
V. CONCLUSION
Collective fear-of the unfamiliar, of the "other"-is responsible
for the denial of procreative freedom to the developmentally dis-
abled throughout history.200 The fear posited itself in compulsory
sterilization statutes based on false eugenic, environmental, thera-
197. In re Guardianship of Hayes, 608 P.2d at 639 (citations omitted).
198. See In re Grady, 426 A.2d 467, 475 (N.J. 1981): "Our courts routinely make such
decisions in adoption and child custody cases. (Citations omitted). Although we do not
equate sterilization of incompetents with adoption or child custody, we think it sufficiently
analogous to warrant close supervision by our courts."
199. Kenyon, supra note 12, at 460.
200. "[Betty] Cochran refers to the removal of the right to make procreative choices
from the retarded as an elitist fright. He [sic] argues that it reflects a fear of sexuality, a fear
of the difference which is called inferiority and a fear for the quality of the species, and
suggests that such fear in turn spawns hatred of races, classes and social categories .. "
LAw REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA, supra note 5, at 48 (citing Cochran, Conception, Coer-
cion and Control: Symposiums on Reproductive Rights of the Mentally Retarded, 5 Hosp.
AND COMM. PSYCH. 25 (May 1974)).
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peutic, and fiscal assumptions. These non-consensual sterilization
statutes should be repealed,0 1 for, from a totally legal perspective,
the statutes authorize an irreversible deprivation of a fundamental
right without due process of law. From an ethical perspective, they
simply cannot be tolerated any longer.
Consensual sterilization, whether ordered by a court under stat-
utory or its own authority, should be performed on a controlled
basis: (1) only after the full panoply of constitutional protection is
afforded the individual, (2) only after the individual him/herself
consents if capable of doing so, and if not, (3) only after creative
devices for maximizing patient input are utilized, such as allowing
the patient the right to refuse sterilization if capable of doing so,
and (4) only after a determination is made that sterilization is in
the individual's best interest, which, in all but rare circumstances,
should be determined by medical necessity.
Perhaps most important, we need to understand that, in large
measure, the way in which we perceive other individuals and situa-
tions determines the way in which we respond to them. Justice
Holmes, and the Court for whom he wrote in Buck v. Bell, re-
sponded from a perception common to the day that developmen-
tally disabled persons are capable of limited emotion and develop-
ment and are manifestly unfit for society. Hopefully, as a result of
research and education, our perceptions are changing, so that a
contemporary Holmes may write:
We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call
upon the best citizens for their lives only in limited situations. It
would be strange, then, if it could call upon an extremely diverse
group of individuals-some of which are our best citizens-for
this great sacrifice in order to fulfill some invalid objective by
some ineffective means. It is better for all the world, if instead of
executing people who are different out of fear and misconception,
society can learn to accept and nurture its different brothers and
sisters, who have a lot to teach us all about life and hope, and
come to realize that we are all different and retarded in many
ways. The principle 'All humans are created equal' is broad
enough to cover 'even those who are different.' Three generations
of myth-conceptions are enough.10
201. Many groups, including the American Civil Liberties Union Board of Directors ad-
vocate complete repeal. S. BRAKEL AND R. ROCK, supra note 17, at 209.
202. See text infra accompanying note 22 for original Holmes quote from which this
prose is adapted.
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